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state of California 

Department of Wa ter Resources 

BULLETIN No. 116-5 



G 1966 

,. A R Y 




The Resources Agency 



State of California 



Department of Water Resources 

state of Cal if ornia 

Department of Water Resources 

BULLETIN No. 116-5 




The Resources Agency 


State of California 



Department of Water Resources 




















Purpose, Authority and Scope 1 


Geology 3 

Tectonic History 7 

Economy 7 

Buildings 9 

Population Centers 10 


Statistics on the Alaskan Earthquake 11 

Crustal Warping 13 

Tsunamis 13 


General 19 

Structural Damage 21 

Defects in Design 23 

Defects in Construction 28 

Damage Resulting from Soil Failures 30 

Landslides 30 

Submarine Slides 30 

Settlement and Foundation Deformation. ... 3^ 

Damage to Facilities 3^ 

Communications Systems 3^ 

Highway Systems 35 

Water Supply Systems 35 


Table of Contents (Continued) 

Sewage Systems 36 

Dams , 36 

Eklutna Project 36 

Miscellaneous 38 


Damage Repair. , , , , 39 

Financial Aid for Local Agencies 40 

Financial Aid to Privately Owned Facilities . , 4l 

In Retrospect 42 


Structural Failure 43 

System Behavior 43 

Bracings and Rigid Connections 43 

Relative Column Stiffness 44 

Flexible Roofs 44 

Foundation Design 44 

Elevated Mass Systems 44 

Light Mass Structures 44 

Irregular Shape Structures 45 

Exposure and Pounding 45 

Importance of Details 45 

Construction Practices 45 

Results of Soils and Foundation 

Engineering Investigation 46 

Soil Studies 46 

Mechanics of Failures 47 

Remedial Measures 48 

Results of Landslide Investigations .... 49 

Submarine Slides 49 

Results of Geological Investigations 49 

Avalanches and Rock Slides 50 

Compaction of Sediments 50 

Landslides 50 

Lurching 50 

Geologic Conditions Related to Damage ... 50 

Submarine Landslides 5I 



Table of Contents (Continued) 


Conclusions « , , . 53 

Property Damage 53 

Soils Failures 54 

Structural Failures 54 

Earthquake Duration. 5^ 

Additional Hazards to Coast Lines 55 

Tectonic Uplift and Subsidence 55 

Rehabilitation 55 

Reconmiendations 55 

Soils Engineering 55 

Structural Engineering . 56 

Construction 57 

Engineering Seismology 57 

Engineering Geology 58 

Rehabilitation Measures 58 







The Turnagain landslide. 

Anchorage, Alaska 

Inlet to small boat harbor at 
Cordova, Picture was taken 
at high tide and shows result 
of tectonic uplift on coastal 

Inner harbor at Cordova during 

high tide 

Meals building in Valdez (power 
plant). No damage , . . 

Post Office in Valdez. No 


An apartment building in Anchorage 
constructed mainly of hollow 
blocks. The damaged block showed 
apparent lack of reinforcement to 
resist lateral deflections. , , . 




Connection failure due to insuf- 
ficient reinforcement steel and 
concrete area 
















The J. C. Penney building in 

Anchorage , , 26 

Connection failure of precast 
members resulting in separation 
of wall from roof 27 

The Alaska Sales and Service 

Building in Anchorage is a good 
example of damage resulting from 
defective connections in precast 
concrete construction 27 

Hollow concrete blocks showing 
failure from lack of grout in 
cells 29 

Compression failure due to 
inability of reinforcement 
to sustain transferred load 
resulting from plastic flow 
of concrete 29 

Fourth Avenue landslide in 

Anchorage 32 

Building damaged by movement of 

foundation 33 

Sag in highway fill near Cordova. , , 35 


Geologic map of epicentral area , . , 4 

Tectonic map of the epicentral area , 5 

Alaskan earthquakes through March 1964, 
magnitude 6-3/4 and greater , . . , 8 

Epicenter map Prince William Sound 
earthquake of March 28, 1964, and 
aftershocks 1? 




FIGURES (continued) 

Map showing land level changes 
along coast of South-Central 

Anchorage slide areas 





I Tide gage observations of Tsunami. 

II Changes in elevations at tide gage 




The material in this report is based upoin Information 
obtained from individuals and organizations working directly on 
the problem of the Alaskan earthquake. The Departr'^.ent of Water 
Resources is grateful to all who developed the information and 
data that made this report possible. 

Special mention is made of the following individuals 
and organizations who provided special assistance in the form 
of written material, reports, or discussion: 

Benloff, Dr. Hugo, Consulting Seismologist 

Committee on the Alaskan Earthquake, National Academy 
of Sciences, National Research Council 

Guertin, Floyd, Commissioner of Administration, 
State of Alaska 

Housner, Dr. George, Professor, Engineering Department, 
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena 

McKlnnon, D A., Alaska Highway Commissioner 

Marliave, E. C, Consulting Geologist 

Mautz, F. F., Chief Civil Engineer, Pacific Gas and 
Electric Co. 

Sargent, Charles, Earthquake Information Center, 
University of Alaska 

Seed, Dr. H. Bolton, Professor, University of 
California, Berkeley 

Steinbrugge, K. V., Earthquake Engineer, Pacific Fire 
Rating Bureau 

U. S, Bureau of Reclamation 

U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey 

U. S. Corps of Engineers 

U. S. Geological Survey 

Weeks, Carl A., Assistant Chief Engineer, National Board 
of Fire Underwriters 

Whitman, N. D., Jr., Consulting Engineer, Whitman, 
Atkinson and Associates. 

Wilson, S. D., Shannon and Wilson, Inc. 



EDMUND G. BROWN, Governor 
HUGO FISHER, Administrator, The Resources Agency 
WILLIAM E. WARNE, Director, Department of Water Resources 
ALFRED R. GOLZE • , Chief Engineer 

Haywood G. Dewey, Jr Division Engineer 

This report was prepared by the 


John W, Marlette, Chairman Senior Engineering Geologist 

Division of Design and Construction 

Herbert H. Chan Senior Engineer, VJater Resources 

Division of Design and Construction 

Paul L. Clifton Associate Construction Analyst 

Staff and Services Management 

William M, Gibson Associate Engineer, Water Resources 

Staff and Services Management 

Bernard B. Gordon Staff Soils Engineer 

Division of Design and Construction 

David M. Hill Senior Engineering Geologist 

Staff and Services Management 



Tragedy struck suddenly on a peaceful Good Friday 
afternoon when south central Alaska was wracked by a violent 
earthquake. The stunning forces of the earthquake caused 
extensive damage by severe shaking of structures and by 
earthquake induced landslides, particularly In Anchorage, 
the largest city. Large seismic sea wavers generated by the 
earthquake rushed into coastal communities, taking many lives. 
Submarine slides carried away port and dockage facilities at 
the seaport communities of Valdez and Seward, Changes in 
shoreline caused by broad, permanent warping of the earth's 
crust seriously affected some small coastal communitier. . 
Transportation, water distribution, and sewage systems were 
temporarily disrupted in some areas. Property loss and the 
detrimental effects oil business and industry &<^-verly impaired 
the economy of south central Alaska, and the road to recovery 
will be difficult, even for the Alaskans, a traditionally 
hardy breed. 

Purpose, Authority and Scope 

Unfortunately, much is still unknown about earth- 
quakes despite a constant striving toward a m.ore cornplete 
understanding by engineers, geologists, and seismologists. 
Although some important knowledge has been obtained by 
laboratory and prototype testing, the study of earthquakes 
and their effects is not completely amenable to laboratory 
test and experiment. The most significant advances in 
earthquake knowledge are made when large earthquakes occur 
and provide a full scale proving ground for the testing of 
theory and practice and the opportunity for the observation 
and evaluation of new phenomena. As a result, progress 
toward more complete knowledge of earthquakes Is spasmodic 
and is dependent upon the occurrence of major earthquakes. 
Because many of the major structures in Alaska were built 
in accordance with current theory and practice for the 
development of earthquake-resistant structures, the Alaskan 
earthquake provides an unusual opportunity to evaluate the 
adequacy or Inadequacy of modern design concepts and 
construction practices. 

The State Water Project, currently under construction 
by the California Department of Water Resources, is a large 
complex water conservation and conveyance system that carries 
water from Northern California to Southern California. The 
system must cross seismically active areas in California, a 
state whose seismic activity Is second only to Alaska. Because 
of the potential earthquake hazard to the aqueduct system, the 
Department made special studies to learn more about California 
earthquakes, and formed a consulting board of experts on 


earthquake problems to furnish advice and counsel for the 
development of an earthquake-resistant system. Realizing 
that experience gained In the Alaskan earthquake might Indicate 
modification or revision of- present Department procedures, 
Mr. Alfred R. Gol'ze', Chief Engineer for the Department of 
Water Resources, on June 3^ 1964, directed that a small com- 
mittee be established within the Department to gather and 
review available information on the Alaskan catastrophe. 
The committee was assigned the task of pi-eparing a report on 
the findings of their study, together with recommendations 
for any modifications of procedures and techniques currently 
used on the State Water Project. 

Mr. J. W. Marlette, Senior Engineering Geologist, 
was appointed as chairman of the committee on the Alaskan 
earthquake. The chairman recommended a committee membership 
representing a number of technical specialities comprised of 
Messrs. P. L. Clifton, Rehabilitation Measures; H. H. Chan, 
Structural Engineering; W. M. Gibson, Seismology; B. B. Gordon, 
Soil Mechanics; and D. M. Hill, Geology. The recommendations 
for the committee were submitted to Mr. Golze' by memorandum 
dated June 22, 1964, and were approved. Funding for the in- 
vestigation was provided for under Work Authority No. 622, 
"Special Engineering Analysis and Criteria Development". 

The committee's assignment consisted of the review 
and evaluation of available information, and no original work 
was performed by committee members. Various organizations 
and individuals still are studying the Alaskan earthquakes, 
and reports of their completed work may not be available for 
several more years. As a consequence, this report cannot 
cover the completed studies, and should be considered as an 
evaluation of information available at this time. 



This chapter provides the reader with a general back- 
ground of the geology, tectonic history, and economic development 
of Alaska (pri or to the Good Friday earthquake. 


The complex geology of Alaska is not completely mapped, 
owing to large areas of difficult terrain and short field seasons. 
Consequently, although the major geologic features are identified, 
within the State, much of the detailed geology is not completely 

The Alaskan landscape is dominated by two major series 
of mountain ranges; the Brooks Range to the north which crosses 
•northern Alaska in a westerly direction and is slightly concave 
northward; and the mighty Alaskan Range to the south v/hich is 
concave to the south. In between the two mountain ranges in the 
interior portion of Alaska lies a lowland area called the Interior 
Plateau. Extending north from the Brooks Range to the Arctic 
Ocean is another lowland area, the Arctic Lowlands. South of 
the Alaskan Range in a concentric arrangement around the Gulf 
of Alaska are the Kenai, Chugach, and Saint Elias mountain ranges. 
Extending off to the southwest in a nearly perfect arc are the 
Aleutian Islands, where most of the Alaskan earthquakes and 
volcanoes occur. The Alaskan Range, the mountain ranges bor- 
dering the Gulf of Alaska, and the Aleutian Islands, are called 
the Pacific Mountain System. 

The stratigraphy of Alaska is complex and contains a 
wide variety of rock types ranging in geologic age from Cambrian 
to Recent. In southern Alaska, the area of interest in this 
report, the rocks contained in the mountain ranges are princi- 
pally slates, shales, argilites, graywackes, and conglomerates 
that range from Paleozoic to Tertiary in age. General distri- 
bution of rock types is shown on Figure 1, entitled "Geologic 
Map of Epicentral Area" . 

The southern Alaska landscape has been magnificently 
sculptured to a rugged grandeur by the work of ice and water, 
forming rugged mountains and deep, narrow fiords. Waste mate- 
rials derived from the erosional processes were carried downstream 
and deposited in lowland areas along major stream valleys, m 
outwash plains along coastal areas, and in stream deltas in the 
fiords. Many of the communities are built upon the detritus 
carried down from mountain ranges bordering the Gulf of Alaska 
and Prince Williams Sound. These alluvial and glacio-fluvial 
clays, silts, and gravels generally are poorly consolidated and 
are prone to landslides and settlement under certain conditions. 

The major geologic structures around the Gulf of 
Alaska are of particular interest in the study of the earthquake. 
The Pacific Mountain System, bordering the Gulf of Alaska, are 











50 100 


Adapted after USCaGS 1964 mop 


formed of sedimentary rocks folded in geosyncllnal and geanti- 
clinal structures. Major faults parallel the axes of these 
major folds in the earth's crust. On the east side of the Gulf 
of Alaska the general trend of major geologic structures is to 
the northwest. As shown in Figure 2, these major geologic 
structures bend around Prince William Sound to a souchvrest trendy 
merging with the structural trend of the Islands, 

The Aleutian Islands have most of the characteristics 
of a classical island arc in that they are arcuate in plan, have 
an associated foredeep or trench adjacent to the convex side, 
have numerous volcanoes, and form a belt of seismic activity 
characterized by shallow focus earthquakes along the foredeep 
and deeper, intermediate focus earthquakes underneath the 
islands. The island chain forms an almost perfect arc 1,400 
miles long with a radius of approximately 750 miles. The 
Aleutian Trench to the south is approximately 15,000 to 25,000 
feet deep and 50 to 100 miles wide. Both the island arc and 
the geologic structures curving around the Gulf of Alaska are 
considered part of the circum-Pacific tectonic belt, or so-called 
'^Rim of Fire" characterized by many faults, numerous earthquakes, 
and much volcanic activity. 

The manner in which island arcs and their associated 
foredeeps form, and the reasons for their unusual volcanic and 
seismic activity are not completely understood, although a num- 
ber of hypotheses have been proposed to explain the phenomena. 
Most of the hypotheses for island arc formations ascribe their 
development to major compressional forces buckling the earth's 
crust. Because shallow focus earthquakes generally occur in 
the foredeep, or trench portion, and intermediate focus earth- 
quakes occur underneath the island arc, it is presumed that 
thrust faults, or high-angle reverse faults have developed 
underneath the island arcs. At the Aleutian Islands these 
types of faults should dip in a general northward direction. 
Tangential fault systems on the islands, presumed by some to 
provide conduits along which magma moves to the surface, causing 
volcanic activity, suggest that in addition to compressional 
folding and thrusting, some rotational movement might be taking 
place in the island chain. Rotational movement conforms with 
the hypothesis that the entire area within the circum-Pa-cific 
belt is moving in a counter-clockwise direction, causing right 
lateral displacement around the margins. 

The abrupt bending of structural trends from a north- 
west to southwest direction around the Gulf of Alaska on through 
the Aleutian Islands, suggests that the forces responsible for 
the development of the island arc in the earth's crust are im- 
pinging upon the continent. Prince William Sound lies roughly 
at the center of curvature for this structural bending. Regard- 
less of the hypothesis selected for the causes of the geologic 
structure. Prince William Sound appears to be in an area of 
considerable stress in the earth's crust. 


It should be emphasized that no major fault was mapped 
at the epicenter, "before or after the earthquake, although new 
secondary faults were mapped on Montague Island after the earth- 
quake. This suggests that Interpretation of the visible portion 
of the earth's crust does not always give a clear picture of 
tectonic structure and activity throughout the crust and mantle 
and that regional structure and tectonic history are essential 
factors to be taken Into consideration when evaluating seismic 

Tectonic History 

Since 1900, when sufficient seismograph stations were 
established to obtain a relatively complete history of earth- 
quakes in Alaska, it has become apparent that Alaska is no 
stranger to relatively large earthquakes. The Instrumental 
records obtained by selsmological stations, since the turn of 
the century. Indicate that approximately 4 percent of energy 
annually released in the world by all earthquakes has an 
Alaskan source. 

As shown in Figure 3, entitled "Alaskan Earthquakes 
thru March 1964, Magnitude 6-3/4 and Greater", most of the 
large earthquakes In Alaska occur in a belt along the Aleufelam 

Another earthquake belt extends from the vlcinl"*-7 of 
Yakutat Bay, southeastward off the west coast of Vancouver 
Island. Six earthquakes of a magnitude of 6-3/4 or greater 
also have occurred in the interior portion of Alaska. 

A tabulation prepared by the U. S. Coast and Geodetic 
Survey of earthquakes felt with an Intensity of 5 or greater in 
the Anchorage area since I788, contains 87 earthquakes. Of 
these 87 earthquakes, 9t or 10 percent, had Instrumental loca- 
tions of epicenters within 1 degree of latitude and longitude 
of the epicenter of the Alaskan Good Friday earthquake, A 
number of the 87 earthquakes tabulated have no instrumental 
locations for their epicenters, but 4 of the epicenters having 
no Instnimental locations are presumed to have originated in 
Prince William Sound. In short, 13 out of 87, or 15 percent, 
of the earthquakes felt in the Anchorage area originated in 
the Prince William Sound area and 9, or 10 percent, were within 
1 degree of latitude or longitude of the epicenter of the Good 
Friday earthquake. Statistically, the eplcentral area in 
Prince William Sound is a prime source of major earthquakes. 


When Alaska was still a territory. Congress prohibited 
organization of local governments. As a result, when Alaska 
became a state, the state government had to take over and operate 
nearly all services normally handled by smaller governmental 




units in other states. Consequently, the Alaska state budget 
Is proportionately larger than other states, and nearly one-half 
of all personal income in Alaska is derived from state government. 
The state budget for the 1963-64 fiscal year was reduced by 
$11 million from the previous year's budget because of extreme 
reductions in tax revenues. Moreover, a federal transitional 
grant of $2.4 million annually for a period of five years after 
statehood, terminated in I963, caiising additional difficulties 
in getting sufficient funds to provide the required services. 

In addition to the economic problems of new statehood, 
the economy of Alaska has been hampered by the chronic problems 
of high costs of power, equipment, and labor, the severe climate, 
and transportation over difficult terrain. Damage created by the 
earthquake and by seismic sea waves has aggravated these problems, 
and it is obvious that full economic recovery of Alaska will be 
a long and difficult process. 

Alaska's present population is estimated to be over 
265,000. The south central portion of Alaska, the part most 
seriously affected by the earthquake, contains about 60 percent 
of the State population and most of this population is centered 
in Anchorage and its environs. The south central portion of 
Alaska produces 55 percent of the State's gross product from 
the basic industries of mining, fishing, and Ixombering, and some 
manufacturing. Military establishments provide some of the 
economic base, as do commerce and trade at the seaport towns. 

Prior to 1940, the Alaskan economy was based on extrac- 
tive industries, primarily minerals, fish, and furs. However, 
the Alaskan nonmetallic mineral industries have been transformed 
during the last two decades from an exporting industry to an 
industry primarily for domestic use worth approximately $10 mil- 
lion annually. Coal, sand, gravel, and crushed stone constituted 
the major part of the Alaskan nonmetallic mineral production, 
until 1961 when petroleum products shot up from 5 to 50 percent. 

Approximately 75 percent of Alaska's manufacturing 
activity consists of fish canning and forest products. The 
remaining 25 percent is primarily concrete products, printing, 
publishing, and food processing. Agriculture yields less than 
1 percent of the personal income of Alaska. 

Alaska imports more than 90 percent of its requirements, 
primarily because of the heavy requirements of military bases. 
Almost half of all personal income in Alaska comes from wage and 
salary payments by federal, state, and local governments. 


The building development in the city of Anchorage, 
where the greatest earthquake damage occurred, is much like that 
of any other western city, with a substantial downtown area and 


a large urban development . The finest urban area in the Anchorage 
District was at Turnagain. This area suffered severe slides during 
the earthquake, and many homes slid into Cook Inlet. The portion 
of the city from 4th Street toward the harbor district contained 
mostly older buildings of flimsily constructed one and two story 
frame construction and was nearing the time for redevelopment. The 
buildings were primarily used for pawn shops, bars, and honky tonks 

Schools in the area were generally of one and two story 
construction. The West Anchorage High School was one of the most 
modern and beautiful high schools in the United States and suf- 
fered severe damage from shaking. The Government Hill School, a 
frame structure, was completely destroyed by slides. 

Population Centers 

The following tabulation shows the I96O population of 
most of the towns and cities affected by the 1964 earthquake: 

Population of 
South Central Alaskan Areas 
(i960 Census) 



Total South Central Districts 

Anchorage Districts 

Anchorage City 

Cordova, McCarthy Districts 

Cordova City 

Kenai - Cook Inlet District 



Kodiak City 

Seward City 
















Because of the lack of adequate instrumentation, no 
instrumental data are available on the behavior of the earthquake 
within Alaska. Although the world-wide network of seismograph 
stations established magnitude, epicentral location, and focal 
depth, none of the types of data needed for engineering analysis 
was obtained. What is known about the earthquake and the ensuing 
tsunamis and crustal warping is presented in this chapter. 

Statistics on the Alaskan Earthquake 

The earthquake occurred at 5:36 Alaskan Standard Time 
on March 27, 1964. Its epicenter was at 61.10 degrees north lat- 
itude and 147.60 degrees west longitude, under land at the north 
margin of Prince William Sound. The depth of focus originally 
was estimated to be 20 kilometers, but recent estimates place the 
focal depth at approximately 60 kilometers. Estimates of the 
magnitude range from 8.4 to 8.75 'on the revised Richter scale, and 
this earthquake may be the greatest one yet recorded on seismographs. 
Damage was experienced in an area of approximately 50,000 square 
miles and the limit of perceptabillty was 1,000,000 square miles. 

The duration of shaking experiencea during the Alaskan 
earthquake was unusually long. The lack of adequate instrumenta- 
tion made it necessary to make estimates of the duration of 
shaking from eyewitness accounts. Understandably these accounts 
conflicted a great deal, but best evidence indicates that the 
period of strong shaking lasted from 4 to 6 minutes in the Anchorage 
area. It should be pointed out that the strong motion record of the 
El Centro earthquake in 1940, frequently used as a basis for design 
in California, had a duration of approximately 25 seconds. 

Anchorage, 75 miles from the epicenter, experienced more 
vibratory damage than communities closer to the epicenter. For 
example, Valdez, 45 miles from the epicenter and Whittier, about 
40 miles from the epicenter, had little structural damage from 
earthquake vibrations, Cordova, about the same distance from the 
epicenter as Anchorage, had little vibratory damage to structures. 

Inniimerable aftershocks followed the main earthquake and 
by March 30, 1964, 52 principal aftershocks were recorded of which 
11 had magnitudes that exceeded 6 on the Richter scale. The after- 
shocks generally moved southwestward toward the tip of Kodiak 
Island, a distance of some 400 miles, although some aftershocks 
were detected in the area east of Montague Island. The trend of 
the aftershocks shown on Figure 4, suggests that the rupture of the 
earth's crust started at the epicenter and moved southwestward in 
the vicinity of the Aleutian Trench to the tip of Kodiak Island. 



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Adopted ofler USCaGS 1964 map 
50 50 100 150 










Crustal Warping 
immediately after the earthquake, coastal communities 
became painfully aware that large P^f i°f °^^^^^ cha^e in^he 

rorrirne!^-of rarc^ Tt^^^^ ^^/^T ^^^^f^^ 

?o reactivate tide stations made l^oP^^atlve by the earthquake 
and seismic sea waves, and to inspect calibrate, ^nd service 
other tidal stations as conditions would permit. Three survey 
ships assisted. 

Nineteen tide gages were put into operation, and new 
comparative tldl! data dirived with reference to nearby un- 

changes in elevation at the 19 tide gages are shown on Table 
No. 2. 

Additional land movements relative to sea level 
were determined by spirit level as follows: 





Grand Island, Prince William Sound +7.2 
McClead Harbor, Montague Island tfi q 
Patton Bay, Montague Island +xH.i^ 

in addition to the lnvestlgatlon| of the U^.^Coast 

rorf ^fn^eflnThf vl'=?^i?y of ?hf ^S?Sua.e tl note change, 
in elevation. 

Preliminary estimates by the U. S. Geological Survey 
indicated ll^'Tool .iles or the earth's crus^was^^_ 

Z't& ??e„rwL'a:|reSsef and fn fref of approximately 600 

HS t"Spi«^-Hi^^h"trtl^^ 

i^telHs OoS square miles were affected by subsidence, and 
ITool'sllkrfr^les affected ^^ -Pf/^^ -J^^^,? 'tf approximately 

affected area of ^J^OO?^^f ^J^ cSl? or n!aM^?mum teutonic sub- 
half the area of the State of ^allfornia ra ^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^ ^^ 

sidence indicated by the tide gages wda :^-:^ -- feet was 

Kodiak island; whereas maximum tectonic uplift of 33 leec was 
measured on Montague Island. 




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studies made by Press and Jackson of the main shock, 
the aftershocks, and the residual displacement of the earth's 
crust, indicate the fault along which the earthquake occurred 
had a nearly vertical plane and was about 65O" km long. They 
concluded from their studies that the priiiiary fault came to 
with 15 to 20 km of the earth's crust and extended 100 to 200 
km into the earth. Estimated energy released Initially was 
3 X 10 ergs, equivalent to a series in line of 100 nuclear 
explosions of 100 megatons each. 

The initial shock and 12,000 aftershocks recorded 
during a 69-day period after the earthquake are estimated to 
have released a total seismic energy of 5 x 10^5 ergs. 


The March 2? earthquake generated a seismic sea wave 
that was destructive in the coastal areas and inlets from 
Kodiak to Valdez . The times of arrival, durations, and maximiim 
rise or fall at 12 tide stations on the west coast and Alaska 
are given in the attached Table No. 1. The tide gage at Sitka 
was the nearest one to the epicenter that survived. Excellent 
records of the seismic sea waves were obtained on the Sitka, 
San Francisco, Hilo, Los Angeles, Alameda, Astoria, and 
Freeport, Texas, tide gages. There may be other records but 
they were not encountered in this study. As all tide gages in 
the epicentral area were lost, arrival times and maximum highs 
and lows are not known, except at Kodiak where they were marked 
and estimated by observers. Waves at Kodiak reached a maximum 
height of 30 feet above mean sea level. 

The seismic sea wave apparently arrived at Cape 
Chiniak and at Seward about 30 minutes after the main shock. 
The highest wave to reach Cordova arrived about 7 hours after 
the initial shock of the earthquake. Greatest damages from 
tsunamis were experienced in the Alaskan communities of Seward, 
Whittier, Valdez, and Kodiakj and in Alberni, British Columbia, 
and Crescent City, California. 

A number of other destructive waves were experienced 
during and following the earthquake at various places in the 
Prince William Sound area. Some of these at Seward and Valdez 
were caused by landslides but the cause of the others is not 
known. Speculation as to the origin of these localized points 
of wave damage centers around the probability of a strong 
northward movement of water into Prince William Sound and flows 
caused by differential vertical movement of the land beneath 
the waters of the sound. Local shoreline configuration certainly 
is a factor, and there is strong suspicion that additional 
submarine landslides might have occurred to cause some of the 
wave damage. Although areas of damage from waves of unknown 
origin are small, the wave action was spectacular, having 
reported wave runups as high as 200 feet above sea level. 



Tide Gage Observations of Tsunami 
(Prom U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey) 



Maximum Rise or 


Tide Station 






h — m 






Attu Island 




18 P 







12 R 







34 R 



Friday Harbor 




58 R 



Neah Bay 




24 R 






hour Seiche 1/2 

ft. off mean curv 






10 R 







9-18 P 







27 P 



San Francisco 




21 P 



Santa Monica 




12 R 



Los Angeles 




24 F 


♦NOTE: Lower limit 

reached on gage; 

2 hours not rec( 


P = 
R = 



Changes In Elevations at Tide Gage Stations 


Length of 
Tide Series 


April 12- 

July 31, 1964 


July 3-31, 1964 


April 14- 

July 31, 1964 


May 19-30- 

July 7-Aug. 6, '. 



May 20-June 1- 
June 14- July 7, 



July 7- Aug. 4, 1964 


May 1964 


May 14- July 31, 1964 


June-July 1964 


May-June 1964 


June 18- July 31, '■ 



May-July 1964 


April-July 1964 


June 11-30- 

July 1-Aug. 14, 



June 13-30- 
August 1964 


July-August 1964 


June 19- 

August 17, 1964 


June 19- 

August 18, 1964 

June 21- 

August 18, 1964 


Cordova, Prince William Sound 

Port Gravlna, Prince William Sound 
Valdez, Prince William Sound 

Port Chalmers, Montague Island, 
Prince William Sound 

Sawmill Bay, Evans Island, 
Prince William Sound 

Chenega Island, Prince William 

Whittier, Prince William Sound 

Seward, Kenai Penisula 

Seldovia, Cook Inlet 

Homer, Cook Inlet 

Nikiskl, Cook Inlet 

Anchorage, Cook Inlet 

Womens Bay, Kodlak Island 

Lazy Bay, Kodiak Island 

Larsen Bay, Kodlak Island 

Uganik Bay, Kodiak Island 
Chignik Bay, Alaska Peninsula 

Sand Point, Popof Island, 
Shumagin Islands 

King Cove, Alaska Peninsula 



Less than 10 percent of the land area of Alaska was 
significantly affected by the earthquake, although 50 percent 
of the population resided and were employed in the affected area. 
Pifty-five percent of the State's gross product was derived from 
the area of earthquake damage. Because of the unfortunate 
geographic distribution of the population and the economic base 
around the earthquake epicenter, the earthquake had a serious 
impact upon both the populace and the economy. This chapter 
discusses the damage that occurred In south central Alaska. 


Current estimates place the total earthquake damage in 
Alaska at $537 million of which $3l8.6 million is estimated damage 
to federal, state, and community facilities. The remaining $219 
million in damage was to private property. Roughly 50 percent of 
the total loss is estimated to have been incurred in the Anchorage 
area. Insured loss has not yet been calculated, but the preliminary 
estimates place it at about $20 million. 

Communities hit hardest by the earthquake, sea waves, or 
both, were Anchorage, the State's largest city, Seward, Valdez, 
Kodiak, Whittler, and coastal villages on the Kenal Penninsula and 
Kodlak Island. Casualities were fewer than might be expected from 
an earthquake of this size. Most of the casualties were due to 
seismic sea waves rushing into coastal communities. A total of 
115 persons were killed in Alaska, 10 in California, and 4 in 
Oregon, as a result of the Alaskan earthquake. 

Contrary to popular belief, the most severe damage from 
seismic shocks was not found close to the epicenter of the earth- 
quake. Anchorage, the town most seriously damaged by shaking, was 
farther from the epicenter than the other damaged communities. On 
the other hand, Whittler, approximately 40 miles from the epicenter, 
suffered little damage from seismic shaking, although it was dam- 
aged by waves and fire. Inconsistencies also were found in damaged 
areas where a structure nearly totally demolished from the earth- 
quake might be adjacent to a relatively undamaged structure. The 
fact that property owned by governmental agencies suffered the 
greatest loss is somewhat startling, even in view of the fact that 
governmental agencies own a proportionately larger percentage of 
property in Alaska than in other states, for it generally is assumed 
that governmental agencies use conservative standards for design and 
construction of their facilities. 


Illustration 1. Inlet to small boat harbor 
at Cordova. Picture was taken at high tide 
and shows result of tectonic uplift on 
coastal communities. 

Illustration 2. Inner harbor at Cordova 
during high tide. 


Landslides and submarine slides were the largest single 
cause of property damage. Other principal sources of damage were 
failure of structures by shaking, settlement or deformation of 
soils underlying the foundations of structures, and the damage 
caused by the tsunamis or seismic sea waves. 

The tectonic uplift and subsidence also will prove costly, 
because of remedial measures necessary at seaport towns to make port 
facilities operative again, and because of resurveying needed to 
correct topographic maps, triangulation stations, and bench marks 
that are no longer accurate. 

News accounts of earthquake damage were focused upon the 
damage but said little of the lack of damage. As a consequence, 
many had the impression that the damage approached total destruction. 
In truth, even in Anchorage, the hardest hit city, estimates of 
damage ranged around 10 percent. Considering the very large magni- 
tude of the earthquake and the tremendous amount of energy released, 
it is remarkable that damage was not more severe. 

Structural Damage 

More flexible structures with long natural periods of 
vibration, generally experienced more vibratory damage than more 
rigid, shorter period structures. For example, chimneys on one 
story houses are short period structures notorious for their 
vulnerability to earthquake damage, yet in Alaska these suffered 
little damage. By inference from the behavior of the structures, 
it is deduced that most of the earthquake energy causing vibration 
damage was in the long period portion of the earthquake spectrum. 
It is known that earthquake waves with periods less than 3 or 4 
seconds attentuate or die out rapidly with distance, and it is 
reasonable to assume that these shorter period waves were filtered 
out by the time the vibrations reached the major cities. The 
outwash deposits underlying Anchorage appeared to amplify the 
ground motion because vibration damage seemed more severe there. 

The longer period ground motions in Anchorage tended to 
cause quasi-resonance with tall, flexible, and larger area struc- 
tures, causing considerable damage to these types of structures. 
Of course, poorly constructed or poorly designed smaller struc- 
tures also suffered damage and well-built taller structures ex- 
perienced little damage or no damage. However, in general, tall 
structures Incurred more damage than short ones. 

There were damages to structures having large elevated 
masses. These masses contributed to the inertial force which had 
to be resisted by the rest of the structure. The Chugach steam 
power generating plant located in the Ship Creek section of 
Anchorage and the power plant at nearby Elmendorf Air Force Base 
both had large bins connected at the top of the structures. 
Although differential settlement in the foundation at Chugach 
probably accentuated the damage, the added mass from the bins 
caused column buckling and connection failures at this plant and 
connection damage at Elmendoi?f . 



Illustration 3. Meals building in Valdez 
(power plant). No damage. 

Illustration 4, 
No damage. 

Post Office in Valdez 


Railroad and highway bridges were affected by the vib- 
ration particularly where the superstructures were simple spans 
resting on tall flexible piers. Deflections of the piers caused 
the spans to Jack-knife down to the ground. 

Prom the viewpoint of construction materials, structures 
constructed of lightweight material, such as wood frame units, 
suffered very little damage as a result of vibration. The greatest 
damage occurred in structures containing heavy-mass type material 
such as masonry. Some basic reasons why more damages were sustained 
by masonry type structures are: (l) Inertial forces, as defined by 
Newton's law of motion, are directly proportional to the mass, and 
therefore, a structure constructed of a heavier material would have 
to resist a greater earthquake force; (2) lighter wood structures 
possess a higher strength to mass ratio than masonry structures; 
(3) wood structures possess a greater rigidity to mass ratio than 
masonry structures, consequently masonry structures resonate to 
longer earth wave periods because of the relatively longer natural 
periods; and (4) that failure in these heavy materials approaches 
brittle fracture. Obviously, there are factors beside construction 
materials that contribute towards structural adequacy of any one 
structure. Structures of almost any material can withstand large 
seismic forces, provided they are properly designed and constructed. 

Types of foundation played a large role for the structures 
that resisted the ground motion. At Alaska, it was found that 
structures properly constructed on piles survived the vibration; 
whereas those built on spread footings did not fare as well. However, 
there were some flat slab bridges where the timber piles actually 
pierced through the deck due to continuous agitation and there were 
some structures founded on piles where the foundation settled, ex- 
posing the piles and stripping them of friction resistance. In the 
first instance, provision of bent caps probably would have provided 
more shear resistance. In the second instance, the settlement em- 
phasizes the need for more extensive investigations into foundation 
problems prior to structural design. 

Defects in Design 

Hollow concrete block was a common building material used 
for commercial and industrial structures as well as apartment houses. 
Much earthquake damage occurred to structures using this type of 
construction material, because (l) as shown in Illustration 5> there 
was insufficient reinfijrcement, or no reinforcement at all to resist 
seismic forces, and (2) there was insufficient overlap of reinforce- 
ment steel to transfer stresses from one bar to another. 

A number of structures were damaged because bracings and 
corner connections either were ignored, or improperly designed to 
form rigid connections. Failure occurred when the Joints were un- 
able to transfer the forces to the proper members for lateral 

Buckling of columns and walls was common. Failures of 
reinforced concrete columns resulted from omission of ties in 


Photograph by J, F. Meehan 

Illustration 5. An apartment building in 
Anchorage constructed mainly of hollow blocks. 
The damaged blocks showed apparent lack of 
reinforcement to resist lateral deflections. 



■5 !■■■■■■■ 

Photograph by J. F, Meehan 

Illustration 6, Structural failures due to 
insufficient reinforcement steel and concrete 


critical areas. Some column failures indicated columns were in- 
adequately designed for compressive strength and had insufficient 
reinforcement or concrete area. 

In other instances, lack of reinforcement and concrete area 
in column connections to floorings or roofs did not permit the columns 
to transfer the moments or shear structurally, resulting in fractured 
columns. This type of failure occurred at the West Anchorage High 
School. Illustration 6 shows failures resulting from insufficient 
reinforcement steel and concrete to resist the lateral shear forces. 

A large portion of the structural steel column failures 
resulted from dynamic response and frame hehavior. These structures 
relied on hearing walls to act vrith the steel frame as a system in 
resisting the lateral forces. Hov;ever, investigations showed that 
these bearing walls, acting also as shear walls, failed initially 
under prolonged vibration, because they were stiffer than the steel 
frame. After the vmlls failed, the entire load of resistance v;as 
shifted to the steel frame, overloading and buckling the frame colijmns, 

Relative column stiffnesses played a large role in struc- 
tural failures as illustrated by the six-story, steel frame Cordova 
Building at Anchorage. This structure, supported by columns at the 
first floor, had one single column braced^ As distribution of shear 
loads is proportioned by the ratio of I/l', L for the braced oolujnn 
was reduced from 10 feet to about 3 feet ^^;hich forced the column to 
take virtually all the lateral load, causing its failure. 

In the J. 0. Penney Building, precast panels v/ere connected 
to the steel frame as an exterior v;all. During the earthquake, con- 
nections between these panels and the steel frame failed when they 
could no longer restrain the deflections of the frame. This failure 
was due ~to the difference in relative stiffness of the tv;o elements 
and the error in designing the structure to act as a homogenous system 
to resist lateral forces dynamically. See Illustration 7. 

Another type of design failure resulted from inadequate 
connections between precast elements. A good example was the Alaska 
Sales and Service Building which was constructed of precast panel 
walls, and precast "T" beam roof resting on precast reinforced con- 
crete bents. Interconnections between the precast elements were 
made by means of v/elded metal connections, .'^i'ter the earthquake, 
investigations showed that the connections failed causing the walls 
to collapse or tilt out of plumb. See Illustrations 8 and 9. 

Architectural designs resulted in structural failures 
although they may be classed as minor damages. The heavy parapet 
walls and other unnecessary gingerbread tore or "became unhinged" 
from their connections, thereby endangering public safety. The 
mass of the parapet walls contributes added inertial forces to a 
structure during vibration, similar to the elevated bins in the 
power plants at Chugach and ELmendorf . 


Illustration 7. The J. C. Penney building 
In Anchorage. 


Photograph by J. F, Meehan 

Illustration 8, Connection failure of precast 
members resulting in separation of v;all from roof, 

Illustration 9. The Alaska Sales and Service 
Building in Anchorage is a good example of 
damage resulting from defective connections 
in precast concrete construction. 


A common type of damage to highway and railroad bridges, 
was the Jamming of the superstructure against the abutment wall. 
This was due to the inability of the bearings at the abutment to 
react against the inertlal force set up from the mass of the 
superstructure under motion. The difference in response between 
the ground motion and the structure also resulted In buckling of 
the deck structure, and, in certain Instances, the end of the deck 
was lifted from its bearings and ended up overriding the abutment. 

Defects in Construction 

It is obvious that no matter how well a structure is 
designed by the engineer, his efforts will be wasted If the struc- 
ture is not built according to his plans and specifications. 
Hollow concrete block construction, which was a common material 
used in structures in Anchorage, suffered greatly from failures 
that were attributed to faulty construction. 

Faulty horizontal construction joints were a source of 
failure in concrete structures. These damages resulted from neg- 
ligence in keeping the joints clean before placing succeeding 
layers of concrete. The foreign particles or dirt left at the 
joint prevented bonding between each concrete placement, and the 
concrete, therefore, could not resist the shearing forces. 

Improper concrete mix in some reinforced concrete 
structures resulted in the concrete possessing inadequate com- 
pressive strength. Failure occurred when the concrete could no 
longer withstand the loads resulting from the vibration and causing 
the concrete to bulge out or "mush out" in a manner similar to 
column failures resulting from insufficient ties. The plasticity 
of the concrete caused the tremendous load to be transferred to 
the reinforcement steel, resulting in a bending failure of 
reinforcement. An example (showing column buckling of reinforce- 
ment steel) is shown In Illustration 11. 

A very large percentage of the structural damages were 
direct results of Inadequate quality control of construction and 
lack of adherence to building codes and specifications. In one 
case, structural failure v/as attributed to a revision made after 
the structure was built by the owner ^vlthout the advice of the 
structural engineer. The owner made openings in the shear walls 
for doors and as a result v/eakened the lateral resistance of the 


Illustration 10. Hollov/ concrete blocks 
sho^^ring lack of grout in cells. 

Illustration 11. Compression failure due 
to inability of reinforcement to sustain 

transferred load resulting from plastic 
flow of concrete. 


Damage Resulting Prom Soil Failures 

Soil fallui'es in the form of landslides, submarine slides, 
and settlement or deformation of foundations under structures was 
responsible for most of the property damage In Alaska. Most of the 
property loss In Anchorage resulted from landslides; whereas much of 
the damage at Seward and Valdez was the result of submarine slides. 


There were a number of reports of landslides, avalanches, 
rock slides and lurch cracks throughout south central Alaska, but 
little detailed Information Is available on the numerous slides, 
except In Anchorage. For this reason the slides in Anchorage are 
the ones covered in this report, although it is recognized that 
slides occurred in other areas. 

The city of Anchorage is on a plain comprised of glacial 
outwash material carried down from the high, rugged, Chugach Mountains. 
Under the city these outwash materials are called the Naptowne out- 
wash, a series of dense sand and gravel deposits, which cover the 
underlying Bootlegger Cove formation comprised of clay, silt, and 
fine sand. Soil failures starting within the Bootlegger Cove for- 
mation caused most of the Anchorage slides. 

Eleven landslides developed in Anchorage during the earth- 
quake. The major slides were: the Fourth Avenue, "L" Street, 
Turnagain — Romlg Hill, First Avenue, Government Hill, and the Ship 
Creek, and Chester Creek Bluffs. 

Because these slides occurred in a highly developed 
urban area, property damage was high. Damage resulted from the 
physical displacement of structures, pressure ridges developing 
at the toes of the slides, and tension cracks, or small grabens, 
developing at the heads of slides. As near as can be determined, 
most of the slides did not develop until after a minute or more of 
earthquake motion, which suggests that the unusually long duration 
of the earthquake was a major factor in landslide failures. It 
should be pointed out that the possibility of earthquake-induced 
landslides developing in the outwash materials underlying the city 
of Anchorage was recognized before the earthquake and was pointed 
out in a report put out by the United States Geological Survey in 

Submarine Slides 

Both Seward and Valdez are located in narrow fiords and 
their waterfront areas have been developed on deltaic outwash 
deposits. Because of the depth of the fiords, the foreset beds of 
the deltaic deposits are steep, with foreset slopes dipping as 
steeply as 30 degrees. The steep underwater slopes of the deltas 
and the type of materials contained in the deltaic deposits made 
these deposits susceptible to failure during an earthquake. The 




Illustration 12. Fourth Avenue 
landslide in Anchorage. 


Photograph by J, F, Meehan 

Illustration 13. Building damaged by movement 
of foundation. 

Illustration 14. Sag in highway fill near 

submarine slide at Seward carried away most of the dockage facilities 
and also affected the shoreline along the adjacent Forest Acres 
residential area. At Valdez, submarine slides also carried away majoi 
port facilities. Because of adverse soil conditions at the old town- 
site, Valdez will be rebuilt at a new site less susceptible to damage 
from submarine slides. 

Settlement and Foundation Deformation 

Damage from settlement of poorly consolidated glacial 
outwash and other types of alluvial materials were noted in a number 
of areas. The Copper River highway which traverses approximately 
14 miles of bay mud and muskeg near the town of Cordova suffered 
much damage from settlement and lurching of highway fills on these 
poor foundation materials. Structures of the Eklutna Project were 
damaged by settlement of alluvial materials. Settlement of soil 
combined with tectonic subsidence lowered the seaport town of Homer 
Spit, causing inundation by the sea, and caused about 5 miles of 
the Alaskan Railroad to be inundated in the vicinity of Turnagain 

There were a number of reports on damage at other places 
where settlement or foundation d'eformation might have been a cause 
of damage but there was insufficient information to be sure. There 
can be no doubt, however, that consolidated soils such as those 
encountered in south central Alaska, are capable of settling or 
deforming during an earthquake and this type of deformation probably 
was more prevalent than reports indicate. 

Damage to Facilities 

Earthquake damage to communication, highway, water supply, 
and sewage systems and the Eklutna hydroelectric project is of 
interest because similar facilities though on a different scale, will 
be used in the State Water Project. With the exception of the Eklutns 
Project, reports of damage to these types of facilities generally 
consisted of brief passages in larger reports, nevB items and brief 
commentaries in periodicals and professional journals. It is diffi- 
cult to compile a complete history from these types of information, 
and the following discussion on damage to various facilities should 
not be construed as a complete report, but rather a synopsis of 
damage to facilities. 

Communications Systems 

Telephone communications in Anchorage were disrupted by 
the earthquake. Within 2-1/2 hours after the earthquake 30 to 40 
percent of the city's telephone system was providing service. Power 
for the telephone system was provided by standby generators or 
batteries at the central offices. Seventy-five percent of the 
circuits within Anchorage were back in service by Saturday, the day 


following the earthquake. The fire department communications center 
had no telephone service for three hours, "but both police and fire 
radio stations remained operative. 

In Seward, telephone service was spasmodic for 24 hours 
after the earthquake. Adequate service was restored after 24 hours. 
Because of power failure, the telephone communications had to depend 
on batteries. Eventually, portable generators were flown In by 
plane to provide power for the telephone system. 

In Valdez, telephone systems remained In service except 
for a two-block strip along the waterfront. 

In Kodlak, the central telephone office was flooded, which 
completely disrupted telephone service. Communications were handled 
by radio, until telephone service could be restored. By April 30, 
the telephone company had restored a hundred circuits to operation. 

Highway Systems 

Highway systems suffered extensive damage. Most of the 
damage was Incurred by bridges or those portions of the highway 
that went over poorly consolidated fine-grained alluvial materials 
in river bottom lands and estuaries. Settlement and lateral spread- 
ing of the underlying alluvial materials caused much damage to 
roadbeds and fills. Many of the bridges were totally destroyed or 
seriously damaged. Many bridges had their abutments move inward, 
whether on fill or rock, causing a shortening of the length between 
abutments. Approach fills settled as much as 3 feet. The Alaskan 
Highway Commission reports that literally bushels of sheared anchor 
bolts were observed on bridges after the earthquake. 

Most recent estimates indicate that damage to roads and 
bridges may reach as high as $75,000,000. State and Federal agencies 
managed to get road systems back into operation quickly. Within 15 
days after the earthquake, the contract for the construction of a 
million dollars worth of temporary bridges had been awarded, and the 
important road connection between Seward and Homer had been reopened 
to traffic. Complete restoration of road facilities will require a 
long period of time. 

Water Supply Systems 

The water supply in the city of Anchorage was obtained 
from 7 wells. Disruption of power after the earthquake made it 
impossible to pump from these wells. In addition, 3 of the 7 wells 
were damaged and have been abandoned. At the time of the earth- 
quake, water supply was by gravity from a water treatment plant at 
the rate of 3^000,000 gpd. Immediately after the earthquake, the 
delivery rate jumped to 11,000,000 gpd because of numerous breaks 
in the distribution system. Even at the 11,000,000 gpd delivery 
jcate, water pressure in the eastern part of the city dropped to zero. 
About six hours after the earthquake, slides near the treatment plant 
intake reduced the delivery rate to about 2,000,000 gpd, a rate which 


was inadequate to make deliveries through the system, because of 
losses through the numerous breaks. As a result, the entire city- 
water supply was shut off and gradually restored section by section. 
Although this left the city without water service for approximately 
24 hours, 75 percent of the service was restored by the end of 
72 hours. 

Examination of failures in the distribution system 
indicated that there were many failures of bell and spigot joints 
in cast iron pipe caused by the spigot ramming into and breaking 
the bell. Where asbestos cement pipe was utilized, the rubber seal 
rings at the joints were frequently displaced causing leakage. A 
24-inch wood stave supply line developed a number of leaks. 

Sewage Systems 

In Anchorage concrete pipe was used mostly for trunk, 
lateral, and outfall lines. In addition to pipe ruptures in slide 
areas, or where pressure ridges developed, other types of pipe 
damage were noted. Some pipes developed longitudinal cracks along 
the sides because of excessive vertical pressures or along the top 
and bottom because of excessive lateral pressures. In either case 
the pipe was deformed from a circular cross section to an oval 
cross section. The reasons for the development of excessive verti- 
cal or lateral stresses on the concrete pipe were not reported. 
Other types of failure to concrete pipe were failures of joints on 
individual (Pipes, and breaks caused by settlement of backfill. In 
areas of earth movement, raising of the center portion of a long 
run of pipe above the hydraulic grade line, resulted in pipe 
flotation. On one sewer outfall made of corrugated metal pipe, 
damage consisted of either broken metal connecting bands or dis- 
placed seals at the joints. 

Damage to sewer lines and the accompanying failure of 
the water distribution system made the sewage system temporarily 
inoperative. Human waste disposal units were established and 
scheduled pickups were in operation the day following the earthquake. 
The sewage lines were returned to operation at about the same time 
water service was restored to the various areas. 


Aside from the damage to the dam at the Eklutna Project 
at Eklutna, nothing was encountered in written reports alluding to 
damage of dams. According to verbal reports, one small dam failed 
in the Anchorage area, and transverse cracks developed in a low 
embankment impounding water for Elmendorf Air Foce Base. 

Eklutna Project 

The Eklutna Project is a small hydroelectric project 
owned and operated by the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation approximately 
34 miles northeast of the City of Anchorage. Water for the project 


is obtained from Eklutna Lake which is impounded by a low earth dam, 
providing a reservoir capacity of 182,100 acre-feet. Water from the 
lake is diverted through Goat Mountain in a 4-1/2-mile long 9-foot 
diameter, circular, concrete lined tunnel, and down through an 
underground steel penstock 1,375 feet long to the Eklutna Power Plant 
on the Knik arm. The plant consists of two 15,000-watt vertical shaft 
generators, each driven by 21,000 horsepower reaction turbines. 
Generators and electrical equipment are housed in a steel and concrete 
building. Prom the Eklutna plant, a 9-niile 115 kilovolt transmission 
line runs north to Palmer and another line 32 miles long runs south- 
west to Anchorage. 

Eklutna Power Plant was back in service 20 minutes after 
the earthquake. High-voltage circuit breakers connecting the plant 
to the transmission lines had been damaged but were quickly bypassed 
by temporary jumpers. A snow slide knocked out the Palmer trans- 
mission line, but the Anchorage line remained in operation. 

At midnight the water supply to the plant ceased, owing to 
damage in the intake structure at Eklutna Lake which allowed a large 
earth plug to build up In the waterway. The earth plug was gradually 
dissipated by working water through the plant, and for the next 6 
weeks the plant was operated on an emergency basis. Periodic shut- 
downs were made to remove sand and rocks and to clean out the cooling 
water system. 

Subsequent inspections of damage showed that the intake 
section had been damaged where it was underlain by alluvial silts, 
sands, and gravels that surround Eklutna Lake. The earthquake had 
caused settlement of the alluvium which developed tensional forces 
and caused separation up to 2 inches wide in many of the Joints of 
the precast concrete pipe used for the intake conduit in the alluvial 

Eklutna Dam is an earth and rockfill structure with wood 
and steel piling core walls, and has a gated spillway with 19 hand- 
operated wooden gates supported by reinforced concrete sheet piling 
piers resting on a concrete base slab. After the earthquake a 
3/4-inch wide crack running along the gate seal at the upper end 
of the spillway was observed. The spillway slab had also had the 
material washed out from underneath. Because the damaged spillway 
cannot resist safely the water pressure at the gates, the gates 
will be kept open until the structure is repaired or replaced. A 
new dam will be built downstream, because subsequent investigation 
indicated foundation materials under the present dam are similar 
to those which caused slide failures in Anchorage. Moreover, it 
will be cheaper to build a new dam than to make repairs to the old 


The tunnel and spillway, leading from Eklutna Lake through 
the mountain to the power plant on the Knik arm, suffered very little 
damage, and most of the damage incurred was due to scouring caused by 
the sand and gravels being carried from Eklutna Lake through the 
conveyance system. 

On the Knik arm the power plant and the tailrace channel 
are on the alluvial deposits bordering Knik arm. These deposits 
compacted severely during the earthquake, and the resulting settle- 
ment damaged the tailrace channel. 

The power plant was set upon piles driven through the 
alluvium and bottomed upon underlying bedrock consisting of graywacke. 
Although the alluvial material settled under the plant, possibly 
separating completely from the bottom of the floor slab, the plant 
suffered little damage, and the piles performed successfully during 
the earthquake. No serious damage was done to the machinery and 
electrical systems. 

By and large, it can be said that the Eklutna Project 
performed well during the Alaskan earthquake. Even so, the esti- 
mated cos:, of repairs to the intake structures, the dam, and the 
tailrace channel, and other miscellaneous items, amounts to 
approximately $4 million. The Bureau has approximately $31 million 
invested in the Eklutna Project which means that the earthquake 
damage amounts to about 13 percent of the original cost. Based on 
initial 9 years of operation prior to the earthquake, it was anti- 
cipated that payout of the project would occur 9 years earlier than 
the 50-*year period normally adopted by the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation 
for such projects. As a result of the earthquake, it is now anti- 
cipated that the revenues will be barely sufficient to return all 
costs to the Treasury with interest during a 50-year period. 


Approximately 15O miles of single track Alaska railroad 
from Seward to Fairbanks was severly damaged. The remaining 320 
miles received only negligible damage, approximately 121 miles 
from Healy to Fairbanks remained in use. The Department of 
Interior has estimated it will cost $24 million to completely 
repair all the damage on the railroad. 

The highway from Seward to Anchorage was blocked by four 
major snow slides, 17 damaged bridges, and large cracks and washouts. 

The bulk oil plant at Seward with 40,000 barrels of 
petroleum product was destroyed by fire. 

All major airports remained operational, but some suffered 
minor to moderate damage. Total damage to airports exceeded 
$1 million. 



The devasting force of the Alaskan catastrophe left 
stricken communities with the problem of digging out of the wreck- 
age and starting restoration of necessary facilities. The rehabil- 
itation measures required were of such magnitude that immediate 
outside assistance was required. This chapter discusses the 
rehabilitation measures taken. 

Damage Repair 

During the first 48 hours, following the earthquake, 
while the Federal Government was organizing its relief effort, 
the military components in Alaska initiated emergency relief 
measures to supplement state and local efforts. 

The Command Post of the Alaska Military Command at 
Anchorage became the center through which communications were 
re-established between Alaska and Washington and between state 
and city civil defense. Military communications personnel and 
signal battalions worked with civilian companies to restore 
communication service. Military water trucks and water purifi- 
cation units were made available where needed. A massive airlift 
consisting of C-123 military transports were used to carry relief 
supplies and equipment to Seward, Valdez, Kodiak and other isolated 
communities. Elmendorf Air Force Base and Camp Richardson furnished 
meals and lodging immediately after the quake. 

In response to a request from Anchorage, military 
authorities were assigned to assist in security and travel control. 
Military personnel, including doctors and nurses, were also 
assigned for emergency work in nearly all of the affected areas. 

Because of the short construction season and the severity 
of the Alaskan winters, reconstruction project planning required 
careful coordination to insure completion of necessary work prior 
to the onset of winter. These plans were developed by Federal, 
State, and local officials, in cooperation with the staff of the 
Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission. The 
following steps resulted from the coordinated efforts? (l) the 
responsible agencies made emergency repairs to utilities and 
highways; (2) extensive geology and soils studies were made to 
determine where these facilities should be permanently reconstructed; 
(3) the projects were designed; and (4) finally, proposals from 
potential contractors were evaluated and contracts awarded. Because 
of the short construction season, time required for almost every 
step was greatly accelerated. 


Top priority was given to the installation of water and 
sewer lines, and this work was started within a few days after the 
earthquake, with permanent reconstruction of all severely damaged 
water lines scheduled for completion by early fall. Airports and 
boat facilities were assigned priority second only to that of water 
and sewers. 

All highways, except for the ones on Turnagain Arm and 
along Copper River, have been temporarily repaired and can handle 
normal traffic loads at reduced speeds. Permanent highway recon- 
struction has been scheduled over a three-year period and is 
estimated to cost about $65 million. Alaska railroad reconstruction 
is being accomplished by internal resources, by contract, and 
through the Corps of Engineers. 

Repair of most schools was completed in time for the 1964 
fall term. Double shifts may be necessary in two or three schools thJ 

Federal and State reconstruction efforts have incorporated 
urban renewal project planning for Anchorage, Cordova, Kodlak, 
Seward, Seldovia, and Valdez . These urban renewal projects will 
provide earthquake damaged communities with better land utilization, 
the removal of blighted area, and more effective traffic patterns. 
Urban renewal applications and planning procedxires, which normally 
take 18 months to 2 years to process, are being processed in 2 or 
3 months. 

Financial Aid for Local Agencies 

In order to maintain essential local and state services 
after the earthquake, the President requested a $22 » 5 million 
authorization for new transitional grants for the period through 
June 30, 1966. This was to compensate for the large loss of tax 
revenue resulting from property damage. Congress increased the 
President's request for this grant from $22.5 million to $23.5 
million to allow for the loss of revenue by the Anchorage School 
District, On May 25,1964, the President requested a total amount of 
$52.2 million to meet various program requirements in Alaska = The 
total amount finally appropriated by the Congress was about $4l 
million, after major deletions of $5.2 million for the Alaska rail- 
road, and $5.6 million for the Corps of Engineers small boat, harbor 
expansion projects. 

Legislation, which amended the Alaska-Omnibus Act and 
provided additional and, in most cases, new types of assistance 
for highways, urban renewal, debt adjustment, harbors, and disaster 
loans were presented to the Congress on May 27, 1964, by the President 

The new legislation provided for an increase in the 
federal share of reconstruction cost from 50 percent to 94.9 percent 
on federal-aid highways. The new legislation also authorized the 


Corps of Engineers to modify previously authorized civil works projects. 
If modification was needed to overcome the adverse effects of the 
earthquake . 

The Farmers Home Administration, the Rural Electrification 
Administration, and the Housing and Home Finance Agency were author- 
ized to adjust the indebtedness of some of their borrowers thereby 
enabling them to cope with earthquake losses. Another amendment to 
the Omnibus Act authorized the Administrator of HHFA to enter into 
construction for grants not exceeding $25 million for urban renewal 
projects in the Alaskan disaster area. Legislation also authorized 
purchases by the Federal Government of up to $25 million of State 
of Alaska Bonds, or the loan of $25 million to the State. Additional 
changes to urban renewal legislation increased the federal share 
from 75 percent to 90 percent of the net project cost. The legis- 
lation also provided authority for federal grants to help adjust or 
retire the outstanding mortgage obligation on the one- to four-family 
residences which were severly damaged or destroyed by the earthquake. 
This legislation has a limiting provision that federal funds cannot 
exceed $5.5 million, and that they must be matched on a 50-50 basis 
by State funds. This legislation was signed by the President on 
August 19, 1964. 

Financial Aid to Privately Owned Facilities 

Federal agencies responded to this disaster by liberalizing 
normal disaster aid policies. Wherever possible, Washington offices 
authorized immediate local processing and/or approval in order to 
reduce time normally required for such repairs . Small Business and 
Rural Electrification Administration, Farmers Home Administration, 
and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries are providing $60 to $70 mil- 
lion in low Interest rate loans. The Federal National Mortgage 
Association and the Veterans Administration agreed to release from 
further obligation mortgages on destroyed property. Borrowers were 
required to make a token payment of $1,000 in order to qualify for 
this relief. The Small Business Administration granted forebearance 
on principal and interest payments for one year, and on principal for 
another four years. It also provided for the first time amortized 
loans on a 30-year basis, using the 20-year maturity plus a 10-year 
extension for orderly liquidation. 

The Small Business Administration agreed to make loans up 
to 30 years at 3 percent Interest for owners who wish to rebuild. 
These loans could also Include the $1,000 token payment required 
under FNMA and VA mortgage forgiveness programs o Farm Home 
Administration also made available 3 percent emergency housing loans 
to rural residents, and offered to adjust Indebtedness of the 
borrowers. Some of the larger lending Institutions indicated. 
Informally, that they would be willing to settle some of their out- 
standing mortgages on a case-by-case basis. The Internal Revenue 
Service extended the April 15 deadline for application of tax rebate 
against the I963 income tax, or against the 1964 estimated tax. 


In Retrospect 

Both local and federal governmental agencies, private 
interests and individuals moved with remarkable alacrity in solving 
the problem of rehabilitation. In order to do what was needed in 
the time allowed, it was necessary to develop a plan, obtain neces- 
sary financing, and put the plan into operation. The accomplishment 
of all these things within a few months required new legislation and 
a drastic acceleration of the governmental processes normally required 
for such matters. 

Because of our greater population, the problems of earth- 
quake rehabilitation could be much greater in California. It would 
appear prudent for California to think about what this state would 
do after a large earthquake and have a general plan of action in 
readiness for such a catastrophe. The procedures used for rehabil- 
itation in Alaska should not be considered as a precedent and guide, 
because they necessarily were developed on the spot for immediate 
solution of the problems at hand. 




Although a number of investigations were made of various 
aspects of the Alaskan earthquake^ the results of the technical 
investigations are of most interest to the Department. This chapter 
summarizes the results of the technical investigations. 

Structural Failures 

A summation of investigations on structural failures 
gathered from reports and articles, through personal meetings, and 
from presentations to various professional societies, is presented 
in the following; 

System Behavior 

When a structure vibrates from ground motion, the struc- 
tural frame, shear walls and exterior walls all react dynamically- 
together as a system. Failure of the designer to recognize this 
fundamental principle can result in serious damage, as dramatically 
shown by the failure of rigid precast concrete exterior walls on a 
flexible frame in the J. C. Penney building. Other structures using 
flexible frames and shear walls resisting horizontal forces as a 
unit, experienced initial failure of the more brittle shear walls, 
thus exposing the frames to the entire vibrational load. This type 
of failure has led to discussions on the amount of resistance the 
frame should be designed for in combination with the shear walls o 
Mr. John J. Driskell, Consulting Structural Engineer, in a letter 
to the Engineering News Record (June 11, 1964) stated, "A critical 
lesson to be learned from these examples is that reliance on shear 
walls in a strong-motion, long-duration earthquake, to provide the 
major resistance to lateral forces, leaving a partial-capacity 
moment-resisting frame to serve as a -second line of defense', is 
to ignore evident facts, made crystal clear in the Anchorage earth- 
quake. The shear walls will predictably be destroyed in the first 
few major excursions, leaving the moment-resisting frame to somehow 
resist the remainder of the duration of the strong motion". 

Bracings and Rigid Connections 

It was found that a number of failures were results of 
negligence or improper design in providing bracings and rigid con- 
nections to transfer the lateral forces to the proper members for 
resistance. West Anchorage High School supposedly was designed in 
accordance with UBC Zone III standards, yet the collapse of the 
structure was attributed partly to improper bracings and connections, 
Another example was an industrial structure where its precast mem- 
bers failed principally because the connections tying these elements 
together were inadequate. 


Relative Column Stiffness 

In the Cordova Building, the stiffening of one column In 
a group to resist lateral forces was disastrous because this single 
column had to resist the full lateral load until It failed, or be- 
came overstressed, before any of the load could be transferred to 

other columns. 

Flexible Roofs 

There were some roof damages, especially In large area 
structures, such as one story warehouses, built with concrete walls 
and wood roofs. The roof deck was too flexible for the relatively 
rigid concrete walls and was unable to function properly as a 
horizontal diaphragm. 

Foundation Design 

It was found that most structures built upon firm foun- 
dations, or founded upon piles, survived the earthquake with little 
or no damage. This Is especially true for rigid structures where 
very little elastic deformation Is assumed, and therefore base shear 
becomes a critical consideration in the design. 

Elevated Mass Systems 

Structures such as the power plants at Chugach and 
Elmendorf had elevated loads that added to the Inertial forces 
developed during vibration. Because these added loads were In a 
critical location, they were a contributing cause of connection 
QGmage and column buckling. Unnecessary parapet walls, heavy 
suspended lighting fixtures, and some architectural ornamentations 
have the same effect during an earthquake as an elevated mass 
system. In addition, veneers and ornaments on walls of a flexible 
nature are readllly loosened during vibration and create unnecessary 

Light Mass Structures 

Because of the basic reasons stated in Chapter IV, light 
mass structures, such as wood frame buildings designed as rigid 
structures, fared well during the earthquake. Obviously, heavy 
mass structures, such as masonry, probably would have fared as well, 
if properly designed or constructed. However, this study indicates 
that, if construction materials are not a prime consideration In 
rigid structures, light mass structures are better than heavy mass 
structures because the earthquake forces and base shear forces are 
not as great in lighter structures. Because of the smaller forces, 
foundations cost less, and smaller base members and connections can 
be used In the lighter structures. 


Irregular Shape Structures 

"L" and "T" shaped buildings and other irregular shape 
structures were susceptible to damages from ground motion because 
the wings were not separated to act as individual units, or they 
were not designed properly to handle forces produced from the 
differences in natural frequencies set up within the structure. 

Exposure and Pounding 

Some damages were incurred when adjacent structures with 
different natural periods of vibration pounded together during the 
earthquake. This type of damage can be reduced by providing ade- 
quate clearance between the structures. Pounding also may damage 
separated wings of irregular shape structures, discussed above, 
unless properly designed. 

Importance in Details 

It was found that a large number of the damages could have 
been avoided if sufficient lengths for splicing of reinforcement 
steel had been made, or hooks had been detailed for bonding, or 
anchorage or better placements of column ties were specified. 
Although not evident in the investigation, it is probable that 
some failures could have been avoided by specifications which pro- 
vide for better control of concrete mixes and grading of aggregates 
or provide for items such as grouting of hollow concrete blocks. 

Because it is difficult to attain the skill of workman- 
ship and closeness of inspection required to produce good quality 
concrete block construction, it appears advisable to avoid this 
type of construction in earthquake resistant structures. 

Construction Practices 

Some of the engineers have pointed out that because of 
the short construction season, generally April 15 to October 15, 
contractors were forced to bypass certain standard construction 
practices in order to meet completion schedules. Obviously, this 
often resulted in an inferior finished product, and evidence in- 
dicates that poor construction was a significant factor in earth- 
quake damage . 

The absence of grout in hollow concrete block walls and 
the absence of reinforcement in some of this type of construction 
is the result of inadequate inspection. In reinforced concrete 
structures, the lack of proper steel placement and insufficient 
lengths for dowels and splices, also indicates faulty inspection. 
Evidence of poor concrete mixes indicates lack of field testing 
and quality control during constmaction. Structural damage re- 
sulting from failure of dirty cold concrete joints, indicates lack 
of enforcement of good construction practices. 


Results of Soils and Foundation Engineering Investigation 

The most completely documented studies of soils and foun- 
dation engineering were contained In reports prepared by Shannon 
and Wilson, Inc., of Seattle for the Alaska District of the U. S. 
Army Corps of Engineers. These reports covered Investigations of 
the Anchorage landslides, the submarine slides at Seward, and 
investigation of a new townslte for Valdez . Although there were 
numerous other reports of soil failures, the Shannon and Wilson 
reports contain the only quantitative information that the 
committee could obtain for study„ There does net seem to have been 
any other major reports made of soils and foundation engineering. 

Soil Studies 

The field Investigations conducted by Shannon and Wilson, 
Inc » , consisted of borings of a variety of types supplemented by 
trenching, geologic mapping, undisturbed soils sampling, field vane 
shear tests, field pore pressure measurements = Also Included as a 
part of these studies were geophysical Investigations and geologlca. 
investigations, consisting of mlneralogical and paleontologlcal 
studies. In addition to the field studies, a laboratory testing 
program was conducted to classify and Identify the various soils 
and to determine their engineering properties. Considerable at- 
tention was paid to relative density of coheslonless soils, and 
sensitivity of clays and silts. 

Special laboratory tests were developed during the 
course of investigation. These special tests Included torsion 
shear tests, laboratory vane shear tests, dynamic modulus 
measurements, shear strength under pulsating loads, and physico- 
chemical analyses of soils. 

In addition to the laboratory test programs, model 
studies were made at the University of California at Berkeley to 
study the mechanics of failure of the Turnagaln slide. The 
Berkeley tests successfully and graphically depicted the pro- 
gressive nature of the sliding in the Turnagaln area. 

Also conducted at the University of California were 
some very interesting dynamic strength tests o Durlrig these tests, 
critical soils were subjected to pulsating loads and/or different 
combinations of principal stresses It was found that these 
critical soils would fall at stress levels much lower than indicated 
by conventional static tests. Quoting from Shannon and Wilson in 
their report on the Anchorage slides 'V..the dynamic loading tests 
on undisturbed samples of very sensitive clay from the Turnagaln 
area indicated that under cyclic .loading conditions failure would 
occur after 50 to 60 cycles at a stress level equal only to 
55 percent of the static strength". The dynamic strength tests 
conducted at Berkeley also showed that liquefaction was possible 
even in relatively dense sands when subjected to the sufficient 
number of stress reversals. Confining pressure and degree of satu- 
ration have been demonstrated to be major environmental factors in 
this relationship. Shannon and Wilson in their report on th^ 


Anchorage slides state "...similar tests on samples of sand recon- 
stituted to a condition thought to be representative of that of 
the in-situ material Indicated that complete liquefaction would 
occur after 60 cycles of stress at a frequency of 2 cycles per 
second with a shear strength of about 0.25 to 0.30 tsf. Failure 
of the specimens In these tests occurred very abruptly with little 
or no strain prior to actual liquefaction and failure of the sample". 

In summarizing the knowledge of materials involved in the 
Anchorage slides it was found that the surflcial material underlying 
the city of Anchorage, the Naptowne outwash, was comprised of rela- 
tively dense gravelly sand. The underlying Bootlegger Cove formation 
could be divided into three zones from the standpoint of soil 
characteristics. It consisted of an upper zone of stiff clay with 
unconfined compressive strengths greater than 0.5 tsf. The middle 
zone contained very sensitive sllty clays, and fine sands and silts 
having unconfined compressive strengths ranging from 0.2 to 0.5 tsf, 
and with a sensitivity of the clays ranging from 30 to 50. The lower 
zone was a fairly stiff competent clay with unconfined compressive 
strengths greater than 0.5 tsf. 

Mechanics of Failures 

A surprising fact about the landslldlng in Anchorage was 
that before the earthquake most of the original bluffs and slopes 
were not considered to be either too steep or too dangerous. 
Ordinary methods of computing stability, using static shear strength 
values, would not have indicated trouble and have been shown in this 
disaster to be misleading. 

According to the reports, most of the slides did not de- 
velop until after the first minute or so of shaking, and they stopped 
when the shaking stopped. The landslide damage was most noticeable 
in development of a "graben" or down dropped block structure that 
formed when the ground mass moved horizontally. These "graben" de- 
veloped in the head or just beyond the head of the slide. Except at 
Turnagain little damage was sustained by structures within the slide 
mass although all access and all utilities were severed by the 

The Shannon and Wilson report concluded that slide failures 
generally developed in zones of maximum shear strains at the upper 
boundary of the weak and sensitive clays and by liquefaction of loose, 
saturated or nearly saturated sands. Where no sand layers were 
present, failures occurred as a result of shear stress reversals un- 
der pulsating loads, of from 1 to 2 cycles per second, which resulted 
in remolding the sensitive clay. 

The "L" Street and Fourth Avenue slides were considered to 
be primarily liquefaction failures. The failures at First Avenue 
and Government Hill were related to oversteepened slopes created 
by previous excavations at the toe. The Government Hill failure 
was by wedge action which might have been caused primarily by 
failure of sensitive clays, although some sand liquefaction was 


also suspected. At Romlg Hill the movement was a conventional 
rotational slide; whereas the bluffs along Ship Creek and Chester 
Creek appear to have been marginal in stability even before the 
earthquake. It is Interesting to note that an old slide plane was 
discovered in the First Avenue slide, and that the Fourth Avenue 
slide area had been recognized for some time as a slide area. 

The landslide at Turnagain was unusual in that the 
failure developed progressively as a sequence of retrogressive 
rotational slides combined with horizontal sliding of massive, 
intact blocks. These major movements are reported to be due to 
severe remolding of sensitive clays. Local movements continued 
for several days after completion of shaking and major settlement 
is expected to continue for years due to reconsolidatlon of the 
sensitive clays. 

Landslide failures can be divided into these three 
general categories; 

1. Those due to liquefaction. 

2. Those due to remolding. 

3o Those due to unbalancing the initial 
static equilibrium. 

Remedial Measures 

Recommendations made for repair and rehabilitation of the 
landslides included? 

1, Fourth Avenue - Combination of slope regrading, 
improvement of subsurface drainage, and construction of earth 
buttresses at the toe of si ope o 

2o "L" Street - Combination of slope regrading with 
gravel buttressing in selected areas , 

3. Romig Hill - Minor regrading. 

4. First Avenue - Slope flattening, minor buttressing, 
and improved subsurface drainage, 

5. Government Hill - Considerable slope flattening con- 
sidered adequate, unless buttress needed to hold up excavated toe. 

For the Turnagain area, however ;, there was some doubt as 
to the best remedial treatment Accordingly, the recommendation 
was made that additional field tests would be desirable to test the 
efficiency of explosives to remold the sensitive clays and thereby 
develop a buffer zone which would permit reclaiming a large part 
of the expensive Turnagain residential development , The tests would 
attempt to develop a delayed- sequence firing system, the optimum 
combination of charges, and the most efficient spacing of holes. 
Sand drains were to be included to facilitate the ensuing reconsol- 
idatlon. No final report of this work has been received but by 


verbal Inquiry it has been learned that only partial success has been 
achieved A new test program involving the use of electro-osmosis as 
a mechanism for stabilizing the sensitive clay is now being considered. 

Results of L andslide Investigations 

The studies of the Anchorage landslides show that analytical 
methods now used, which rely on use of static equilibrium and static 
strengths in estimating slope stability, are inadequate when dynamic 
forces from an earthquake are involved For adequate analysis, the 
response of the soil mass to dynamic forces must be determined. For 
this, it is necessary to know the characteristics of the earthquake 
such ast the duration of the shaking; and amplitude, period, fre- 
quency; and acceleration of the ground motion = Shannon and Wilson 
developed a rather simple, but crude, method of analysis in their 
attempts to determine corrective methods of treatment.. Although 
their approach is not completely desirable, more sophisticated analyses, 
which appear promising, are being worked upon at the Berkeley campus. 

It is clear that realistic factors of safety must consider 
both shear strength failure and excessive deformations. 

Sub marine Slides 

Submarine slides which followed the Good Friday earthquake 
have been reported as the major cause of damage at both Valdez and 
Seward At the latter city, the waterfront, and the Forest Acres 
residential area north of Seward, have been badly damaged At Valdez 
most of the waterfront was destroyed. 

The submarine landslide at Seward was carefully examined 
by Shannon and Wilson, Inc., for the Alaska District Corps of 
Engineers. They report the geological profile composed of three 
basic units ^ Upper sand and gravel deposits of alluvial and glacio- 
fluvlal materials ranging from fine sand and silt, to boulders; a 
middle deposit of sllty, medium-to- very fine-grained uniform sand 
interbedded with clayey silt and occasional layers of gravel and 
coarse sand; and lower sand and gravel deposits denser than the 
upper stratum and Interbedded with glacial tillo Bedrock was beyond 
the range of penetration of the seismic surveys used, 

At Seward the submarine slides were reported as the con- 
ventional rotational type which subsequently liquefied and became 
flow slides moving large di3tances„ The slide debris was distributed 
as a thin layer over the floor of the bay at depths too great to 
detect its presence. The failure was considered to be progressive 
and successive slides developed as the earthquake continued. 

Results of Geological Investigations 

Most of the geologic investigations that took place in 
Alaska after the earthquake occurred were conducted by the United 
States Geological Survey. Complete results of their investigations 


have not yet been compiled Into report form. The preliminary work 
of the USGS, In addition to providing an excellent report of damage 
In Alaska and related earthquake phenomena. Indicated the following 
geologic factors affecting damage. 

Avalanches and Rock Slides 

The earthquake caused thousands of snow avalanches and 
rock slides. The principal areas of occurrence for these slides 
were the Kenal Mountains, the Chugach Mountains and the Islands in 
Prince William Sound. Snow avalanches were noted as far away as 
150 miles. 

Compaction of Sediments 

Poorly consolidated alluvial glaclofluvlal, and geologi- 
cally young sediments were compacted by the action of the earthquake 
Although this phenomena was noted in a number of places. It was 
specifically noted in Homer Spit and Portage. 

Consolidation of sediments combined with tectonic sub- 
sidence was responsible for damage encroaching water lines at 
Homer Spit and caused inundation of approximately 5 miles of rlght- 
of-v;ay of the Alaskan railroad in the Portage area. Settlement of 
approaches was noted at a number of bridges. Damage from approach 
settlements was particularly noticeable where the bridge spans 
placed on piles settled very little in relation to approach 


The types of materials that experienced settlement, the 
poorly consolidated, alluvial and glaclofluvlal deposits, were the 
ones in which most of the destructive landslides developed. These 
include the Anchorage landslides and the landslide at Potter that 
damaged the Alaskan railroad. 


Lurching effects in the unconsolidated deposits were 
also noted on some structures, and some displacement of highways 
and piles are attributed to this cause. 

Geologic Conditions Related to Damage 

It was obvious from observation of the damage in Alaska, 
that those buildings on bedrock generally suffered less damage than 
those on the unconsolidated deposits. It was pointed out by the 
USGS that large concrete buildings which were on bedrock at 
V.'hittier, approximately 40 miles from the epicenter, received less 
damage than similar structures at Anchorage on outwash gravels and 
clays 75 miles from the epicenter. Cordova, underlain by bedrock 
also v;as about the same distance as Anchorage from the epicenter of 
the earthquake, but suffered little structural damage from shaking. 


In Anchorage It was noted that structures underlain either by a thin 
layer of gravel which covered the Bootlegger Cove formation, or under- 
lain by silt, were much more severely damaged than those underlain by 
thicker layers of gravel. 

Submarine Landslides 

It is suspected that more submarine slides occurred in 
deltaic materials deposited in the narrow fiords around Prince 
William Sound than were observed. These types of failures were 
reported at Valdez and Seward, but because the other fiords are 
uninhabited, no information Is available. There is ample evidence 
that the fiord deltas can be unstable under earthquake conditions, 
and considerable care should be exercised in future development of 
town sites, and dockage areas on the shorelines of such deposits. 



The review of reports on the Alaskan earthquake damage 
Indicates that structures can be built to satisfactorily resist 
forces from a major earthquake, provided they are properly con- 
ceived, designed and constructed. There is room for improvement, 
however, and better information is needed about the following: 
response spectra for buildings and earth masses; earthquake forces, 
the weakening effects of earthquakes on soil and rock masses, and 
the interrelationship between the structure, its foundation, and 
its geologic setting. 

The yardstick used by seismologists to measure earthquakes, 
the magnitude rating, has little significance to the designer, and, 
therefore, earthquake indices more useful to the designer should be 
developed. The designer also needs to be provided with better sta- 
tistical data on the probability, frequency, and type of earthquake 
anticipated so that he can evaluate better the risks involved. 

It should be emphasized that there are dissimilarities 
between Alaska and California, and discretion must be used in drawing 
cor.parisons between what happened in Alaska and what might happen in 
California. Although information obtained from the Alaskan earth- 
quake has added to our knowledge of earthquakes, particularly in the 
field of structural and soils engineering, there are still large voids 
which can be filled only be continuing studies of California earth- 
quakes and their related problems. 

Conclusions drawn from the Alaskan earthquake and recom- 
mendations for making the State Water Project more resistant to 
earthquake damage are presented in the following. Although the 
recommendations were formulated for application to the State Water 
Project, they have a general application to other activities of the 
Department . 


Property Damage 

1. The initial publicity on the Alaskan earthquake gave 
the Impression that south central Alaska experienced nearly total 
destruction. This impression was inaccurate, and competent observers 
estimate that even in Anchorage, the hardest hit community in terms 
of dollar value of property loss, approximately 90 percent of the 
structures remained relatively undamaged. 

2. Although there are exceptions, damage to property can 
be classified into four broad categories: (l) damage caused by 
landslides or submarine slides; (2) damage caused by structural fail- 
ures resulting from shaking; (3) damage caused by tsunamis and seismic 


sea waves rushing into coastal conununltles; and (4) damage to 
structures caused by settlement of foundation materials. Of the 
four general categories of damage the landslides and submarine 
slides were responsible for the greatest property loss; whereas 
the tsunamis and seismic sea waves were responsible for the greatest 
loss of life. 

Soils Failures 

1. Investigations of Anchorage landslides indicated that 
although the materials in the slides probably would be stable under 
normal conditions, earthquake vibrations caused liquefaction of 
sands or remolded highly sensitive clays, reducing the strength of 
the materials to the point of failure. The unusually long duration 
of shaking was a major factor in slide failures. 

2. The earthquake vibrations caused settlement of soils. 
This settlement, which probably resulted from compaction or lique- 
faction, caused considerable damage. 

Structural Failures 

1. Failures of structures from shaking can be attrib- 
uted to the following causes: (l) the designer's lack of complete 
understanding of the complexities of earthquake-resistant design; 
(2) failure to build the structure as it was designed; and (3) poor 
construction practices that result in structural weakness. 

2. Striictures, particularly long period structures, can 
experience severe damage at distances up to 75 miles from the epi- 
center of a great earthquake, especially where foundation conditions 
amplify ground motion. 

3. Structures with long periods of response generally 
suffered more damage from earthquake vibrations than those with 
short periods of response. 

4. Greatest damage was experienced by structures in areas 
underlain by poor foundation conditions. Structures founded upon 
bedrock generally suffered the least damage. 

5. Masonry and precast concrete construction appeared to 
be particularly susceptible to vibration damage. Masonry failures 
were due primarily to poor construction; precast concrete failures 
were due primarily to faulty connections. 

Earthquake Duration 

The duration of the earthquake, estimated from 4 to 
6 minutes, was unusually long. 


Additional Hazards to Coastlines 

In addition to the usual earthquake hazards, coast lines 
of seismically active areas are exposed to additional damage from 
destructive seismic sea waves, submarine slides, and permanent 
effects of changes In shoreline caused by regional tectonic warping. 

Tectonic Uplift and Subsidence 

The crustal warping that accompanied the earthquake caused 
tectonic uplift or subsidence that affected an area currently esti- 
mated to be 83,000 square miles, equal to about half the area of the 
State of California. 


In examining the rehabilitation measures that are necessary 
after a disaster of this magnitude, it is obvious that a predetermined 
course of action should be available prior to such a disaster. Emer- 
gency procedures taken in Alaska for rehabilitation and restoration 
should not be considered as a precedent or a guide. 


The recommendations made as a result of this investigation 
are directed specifically toward design and construction of the State 
VJater Project, but the recommendations have general application to 
the development of earthquake-resistant structures throughout the 

Soils Engineering 

In soils engineering investigations it is recommended that: 

1. Techniques for stability analyses of embankments, cut 
slopes, and natural slopes should be revised to Include consideration 
of strength reduction in soils due to pulsating loads and accompany- 
ing plastic deformation or liquefaction. Two kinds of safety factors 
must be defined in these types of analyses; one for actual shear 
failure or flow, and one for the detrimental deformation of the 

2. To aid in identifying materials susceptible to severe 
loss of strength during earthquakes, it should be a standard 
Department procedure to make relative density tests on coheslonless 
materials and sensitivity tests on clays during preliminary soils 
test programs. 

3. In order to make meaningful use of dynamic strength 
tests of soils, the soils engineer must be provided with an estimate 
of the number of load pulses that might be expected from earthquakes 
in California. This should be done by synthesis of data from exist- 
ing seismograph records. In addition, methods need to be developed 
for determining response of soils to the ground motions anticipated. 


4. It is recommended that where foundation materials are 
comprised of either loose, cohesionless soils prone to settlement 
for vibration, or of materials subject to loss of strength from 
pulsating loading, piles or other deep type of foundation be used 

for structures. 

Structural Engineering 

In the design of earthquake-resistant structures for the 
State Water Project it is recommended that: 

1. Supervisors responsible for design of earthquake- 
resistant structures should continue to make sure that design 
criteria, the design, and any revision to the design are made by 
engineers who are specialized in and have a good understanding of 
the complexities of earthquake-resistant design. 

2. When positions whose duties require knowledge of the 
principles of earthquake resistant design are to be filled, pro- 
spective applicants should be required to demonstrate their 
proficiency in earthquake resistant design. Present civil service 
procedures should be modified to include testing the applicant's 
knowledge of the dynamic response of structures, behavior of 
structures under submergence and other aspects of earthquake 
resistant design, in addition to other skills normally tested in 
the examination process. It should not be assvuned that the 
"core classification" always will provide personnel with the 
desired experience and knowledge for the design of hydraulic 

3. The existing Uniform Building Code should be consid- 
ered as the minimum design criteria for structures. In many cases, 
it may be desirable to incorporate additional provisions into the 
design. Design supervisors should be responsible for the develop- 
ment of additional criteria and provisions where needed and should 
make use of consulting board members or staff specialists in 
developing these additional measures. 

4. The designer should continue to pay particular atten- 
tion to the following items in the design of earthquake-resistant 
structures: irregular building shape, flexible roofs, wall materials, 
pounding exposure, elevated masses, and precast reinforced concrete 

5. The following design treatment generally should be 
used for shear walls; For low rigid structures, especially those 
with box frames, shear walls should be included in resisting lateral 
forces, because it usually is assumed that no elastic deformation 
occurs in these types of structures. For tall, flexible structures 
possessing frame-shear wall combinations, shear walls should not be 
counted upon for resistance to lateral forces; consequently the 
frames should be designed to resist all lateral forces. 



For construction. It Is recommended that: 

1. Efforts to tighten field Inspection controls and en- 
force proper construction methods should be continued. 

2. For earthquake-resistant structures, designers should 
make all construction details clear. Lack of clarity or lack of 
details on design drawings forces the resident engineer to guess 
the designer's Intention and a wrong guess could prove disastrous. 
Design drawings should have sufficient detail, so field construction 
personnel can produce the real Intent of the design. For earthquake- 
resistant structures, details pertaining to lapping lengths, splic- 
ing locations and placing of reinforcing steel, and structural 
bracings and connections, particularly in critical areas should be 
clearly defined and drawn. The jamming of too many details into one 
drav;ing sheet should be avoided, as the resulting clutter can lead 

to confusion and erroneous interpretation. 

3. A standard procedure be established and followed 
wherein it would be the responsibility of the program managers to 
bring designers of the structure and the field construction person- 
nel together for briefings prior to construction. In these brief- 
ings, the designers should inform construction personnel on critical 
items requiring special attention during construction. The designers 
also should brief construction personnel on the design approach and 
on any unique design principles used. Such a procedure would give 
construction personnel better insight into the design problems, and 
would help to ensure that the designer's intent is Incorporated in 
the completed structure. 

4. No field revisions should be made in a structure without 
prior approval of the designer. 

5. When an earthquake-resistant structure has been com- 
pleted, and subsequent modifications are to be made, these modifi- 
cations should be approved by competent design engineers, preferably 
the originating design group familiar with the structure. 

Engineering Seismology 

In the field of engineering seismology, it is recommended 
that: The designer should be provided with more meaningful infor- 
mation on earthquake hazard and the ground motion for which he 
should design. It is necessary to continue with the seismic 
information program in order to learn more about the behavior of 
California earthquakes. The most Important types of instmments 
are the strong motion instruments which, however, need considerable 


Engineering Geology 

In conducting engineering geology Investigations In the 
future it is recommended that: 

1. A site for a proposed structure should be considered 
in the reference of regional tectonic framework as well as the 
geology in the immediate vicinity of the site. The attitude of "no 
fault, no worry" in site hazard evaluation is not always true. 

2. The designer should be made aware that areas near 
active faults may be subjected to tectonic uplift or subsidence. 
It is not possible to accurately predict what the areal extent of 
such deformations might be, or the magnitude. Because of the 
unpredictable nature of tectonic deformation, it does not appear 
that large sums of money should be spent in an attempt to make 
structures resistant to this type of phenomena. It should be kept 
in mind by the designer, however, and if opportunities arise to 
provide some protection against tectonic movements at little extra 
cost, he should avail himself of these opportunities. Operations 
and maintenance personnel also should be made aware that crustal 
warping could seriously affect aqueduct operations. 

3. The geologist should impress upon the designer that 
damage can occur to structures at least as far as 75 miles from 
major faults, particularly where soils conditions are poor, and the 
structure under consideration has a long period of response. 

4. For- site investigations of structures located on the 
coast line, such as a nuclear power plant, the site evaluation per- 
formed by the engineering geologist should take into consideration 
potential damage from seismic sea waves, submarine landslides, and 
changes in the coast line elevation caused by an uplift or down 
warping resulting from tectonic movement. Specific items to be 
considered are probable sources of seismic sea waves, their effect 
upon the coast line, local shoreline configuration, the type of 
off-shore sediments, an evaluation of the possibility of submarine 
landslides, and the possibility of wave damage caused from sub- 
marine slides in the vicinity of the site. 

Rehabilitation Measures 

In order to be adequately prepared for rehabilitation of 
the State Water Project in the event of earthquake damage, it is 
recommended that: 

1. The Chief Engineer should have complete authority to 
take necessary remedial measures to the State Water Project when a 
catastrophe occurs. Moreover he must have immediate access to 
adequate sums of capital needed to mobilize the necessary equipment, 
manpower, and materials needed to put the aqueduct system back into 
operation. He must have the authority to make immediate decisions 
on expenditures and mobilization of equipment and manpower without 
going through procedures normally required for such actions. 


2. It is recommended that a committee be formed within 
the Department and that this committee be assigned the responsi- 
bility of (1) identifying the problems involved in making such 
emergency authorities available to the Chief Engineer, (2) exploring 
methods by which the necessary emergency authorities can be provided, 
and (3) recommending action needed to make these authorities avail- 
able to the Chief Engineer. 

3. An effective and comprehensive damage control plan 
which would clearly outline the action of all organizational 
functions in the event of a damaging earthquake should be developed. 
Such a plan should be so clearly defined that field functions would 
be able to operate during the first few hours after an earthquake 
without communication with headquarters, and would know how to ob- 
tain equipment, men and materials for emergency repairs. Such a 
plan should also provide for a tentative priority of repairs, so 
restoration can be made in an orderly fashion without duplication 
of effort. The plan should also maintain an inventory of the 
availability of heavy equipment such as that done by the "AGC Plan 
Bulldozer" and would make this information available to all parties 
concerned. Although the Department should have the sole authority 
for conducting repair operations, its disaster plan should be 
coordinated with the State Disaster Office. 

4. In the event of a major earthquake it is conceivable 
that funds needed immediately to make extensive repairs would ex- 
ceed emergency funds readily available to the Department. Because 
the project is operated and owned by the State it would appear that 
emergency State funds normally available to other public agencies 
might not be available to the Department. 

It is recommended that a committee be formed to look into 
the matter of emergency financing for repair and rehabilitation. A 
suggested approach would be to have the Division of Design and 
Construction and the Statewide Operations Office make a rough estimate 
of the dollar amount of damage that might be sustained by the aque- 
duct system during an earthquake. The Staff and Services Management 
and Legal Staff might explore methods of obtaining the estimated 
amount of emergency funds required. Upon completion of the study, 
the committee should recommend the action needed to bring about the 
amount of emergency financing estimated to be needed. 



The Alaskan Construction Consultant Committee, "Reconstruction 
and Development Survey of Earthquake Damage In Alaska", 1964. 

,•'.;. vU-k.-.n Publishing Company, "Great Alaska Earthquake, A 
Pictorial Review", April 1964. 

The American Institute of Architects and the Engineers Joint 
Council Committees, "Report on Restoration and Development 
of Alaska", June 1964. 

Benioff, H., "Orogenesis and Deep Crustal Structure - 

Additional Evidence from Seismology", Geological Society 
of America Bulletin, Vol. 65, No. 5, 1954. 

Bowman, C. P., "The Miracle of Engineering", The American 
Engineer, December 1964. 

Coats, R. C, "Reconnalsance Geology of Some Western 
Aleutian Islands, Alaska", U. S. Geological Survey 
Bulletin 1028-E, 1956. 

Coats, R. C, "Volcanic Activity In the Aleutian Arc", 
U. S. Geological Survey Bulletin 974-B, 1950. 

Cerutti, J. C, "A Hard Look at Buildings In Alaska", 
The American Engineer, December 1964. 

Engineering Geology Evaluation Group, "Preliminary Report 2? 
March 1964, Earthquake in Greater Anchorage Area", 
April 1964. 

Engineering News Record, "Alaskan Quake Repairs to Cost 
$58 Million", September 24, 1964. 

Engineering News Record, "Dam Has $3 Million Repair Bill" 
October 29, 1964. 

Engineering News Record, "Quake Wrecks Alaskan Cities", 
April 2, 1964. 

Engineering News Record, "Rebuilding Funds Pushed to Alaska 
Quake Area", June 4, 1964. 

Engineering News Record, "Sloppy Field Work Blamed for 
Earthquake Damage", November 5* 1964. 

Engineering News Record, "The Verdict of Alaska, Good 
Structural Design Survived", April 9, 1964. 


Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission 
for Alaska, "Response to Disaster", September 1964. 

Gates, Oc and Gibson, W., "Interpretation of the Configuration 
of the Aleutian Ridge", Geological Society of America 
Bulletin, Vol. 67, No. 2, 1956. 

Grantz, A., Plafker, G., and Kachadoorian, R., "Alaska's Good 
Friday Earthquake, March 27, 1964, A Preliminary Geologic 
Evaluation", U. S. Geological Survey Circular 491, 1964. 

Gutenberg, B. and Rlchter, C. P„, "Seismicity of the Earth and 
Associated- Phenomena", Princeton University Press, 1954. 

Headquarters Alaskan Command, "Operation Helping Hand", 1964. 

Logan, Mo H., "Effects of Alaska's Good Friday Earthquake on 

the Eklutna Hydroelectric Project", unpublished report, 1964. 

Megliaccio, R. R., "Preliminary Report on the Geologic Effects 
of the March 27th Earthquake at Valdez, Alaska", April 1964. 

Munay, H. W., "Profiles of the Aleutian Trench", Geological 
Society of America Bulletin, Vol 56, No. 7, 1945. 

The National Board of Fire Underwriters and the Pacific Fire 
Rating Bureau, "The Alaskan Earthquake", 1964. 

Office of Emergency Planning, "Impact of Earthquake March 27, 
1964, Upon the Economy cf Alaska", April 1964, 

Office of Emergency Planning, "Types of Assistance to Alaska 
from Federal Departments and Agencies", April 1964. 

Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Mautz, F. F., "Report on 
Inspection of Earthquake Damage Anchorage, Alaska, 
April 22-28, 1964". 

Press, F. and Jackson, D. , "Alaskan Earthquake, 27 March 
1964j Vertical Extent of Faulting and Elastic Strain 
Energy Re] ease". Science, February 1965, 

Reclamation Era, "Wracked Alaska Had Power", November, 1964. 

Rice, E. P., "The Alaskan Earthquake", Civil Engineering, May 1964. 

Rlchter, C. F., "Cal Techs' Seismological Laboratory Goes to 
Work on the Alaskan Earthquake", Engineering and Science 
Magazine, April I964. 

St,. Amand, Pierre, "Geologica;i. and Geophysical Synthesis of the 
Tectonics of Portions of British Columbia, the Yukon Territory, 
and Alaska", Geological Society of America Bulletin, Vol 68, 
No. 10, 1957. 


Shannon and Wilson, Inc., "Report on Anchorage Area Soil Studies 
to U, S. Army Engineer District, Anchorage, Alaska", 
August 1964. 

Shannon and VJilson, Inc., "Report on Subsurface Investigation 
for Mineral Creek Townsite, City of Valdez, Alaska to 
U, S. Army Engineer District, Anchorage, Alaska", August 1964. 

Shannon and Wilson, Inc., "Report on Subsurface Investigation 
for City of Seward, Alaska and Vicinity to U. S, Army 
Engineer District, Anchorage, Alaska", August 1964. 

Shamrock, G., "Planning Alaska's Cities After the Earthquake", 
Western City, August 1964. 

Smith, C, P., "Earthquake Versus Bridges", the American Engineer, 
December 1964. 

State of Alaska, Department of Highv/ays, "Report on Highway 
Damage", 1964. 

Task Force No. 9, "30 Day Report of the Scientific and Engineering 
Task Force", May 1964. 

U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, Unpublished Reports on Earthquake 
Damage to the Eklutna Project, 1964. 

U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, "Preliminary Report, Prince 
William Sound Earthquakes, March- April, 1964". 

University of Alaska, "Possessors of Information on the Alaska 
Earthquake of March 21, 1964", August 1964. 

Western Construction, "Alaska's Broken Roads and Bridges", 
June 1964. 

Western Construction, "Organizing for Reconstruction", 
August 1964. 

Young, Rosemary S., "Crescent City Disaster", 1964. 


Shannon and Wilson, Inc., "Report on Anchorage Area Soil Studies 
to U. S. Army Engineer District, Anchorage, Alaska", 
August 1964. 

Shannon and Wilson, Inc., "Report on Subsurface Investigation 
for Mineral Creek Townsite, City of Valdez, Alaska to 
U. S. Army Engineer District, Anchorage, Alaska"^ August 1964. 

Shannon and Wilson, Inc., "Report on Subsurface Investigation 
for City of Seward, Alaska and Vicinity to U. S. Array 
Engineer District, Anchorage^ Alaska", August 1964. 

Shamrock, G., "Planning Alaska's Cities After the Earthquake", 
Western City, August 1964. 

Smith, C. P., "Earthquake Versus Bridges", The American Engineer, 
December 1964. 

State of Alaska, Department of Highways, "Report on Highway 
Damage", 1964. 

U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, Unpublished Reports on Earthquake 
Damage to the Eklutna Project, 1964. 

U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, "Preliminary Report, Prince 
William Sound Earthquakes, March- April, 1964". 

University of Alaska, "Possessors of Information on the Alaska 
Earthquake of March 27, 1964", August 1964. 

Western Construction, "Alaska's Broken Roads and Bridges", 
June 1964, 

Western Construction, "Organizing for Reconstruction", 
August 1964. 

Young, Rosemary S,, "Crescent City Disaster", 1964. 





r.'AP. 9 REC'Q 

Book Slip-25m-6,'66(G3855s4)458 



N° 479884 


California. Dept. 


0^ Water Resources, 



no, 116: 5 





3 1175 02037 7548